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Crowdsourcing offers unprecedented potential for solving tasks efficiently
by tapping into the skills of large groups of people. A salient feature of
crowdsourcing—its openness of entry—makes it vulnerable to malicious be-
haviour. Such behaviour took place in a number of recent popular
crowdsourcing competitions. We provide game-theoretic analysis of a funda-
mental trade-off between the potential for increased productivity and the
possibility of being set back by malicious behaviour. Our results show that
in crowdsourcing competitions malicious behaviour is the norm, not the
anomaly—a result contrary to the conventional wisdom in the area. Counter-
intuitively, making the attacks more costly does not deter them but leads to a
less desirable outcome. These findings have cautionary implications for the
design of crowdsourcing competitions.
1. Introduction
Numerous successful examples of the power of crowdsourcing to solve pro-
blems of extreme difficulty [1–14] have overshadowed important episodes
where elaborate sabotage derailed or severely hindered collective efforts. The
winning team in the DARPA Network Challenge obtained the locations of
the 10 balloons after spending significant efforts filtering the majority of false
submissions, including fabricated pictures containing individuals in disguise
impersonating DARPA officials [15]. A team from the University of California
at San Diego lost its lead in the DARPA Shredder Challenge after their progress
was completely wiped out by a relentless number of coordinated overnight
attacks [16,17]. The team that topped the US Department of State sponsored
Tag Challenge had to withstand a smear campaign orchestrated in Twitter
aimed at reducing its credibility [10]. Beyond crowdsourcing competitions,
Ushahidi’s collective conflict mapping for the Arab Spring had to be shut
down for long periods of time owing to suspicions that it had been infiltrated
by government officials [16].
These episodes have received a response in the form of emerging work at
the intersection of the computer and economic sciences. Recent results in this
area have elucidated that it is possible to design incentive structures and algo-
rithmic strategies to modify the efficacy and quality of the crowdsourced
solution, the vulnerability of crowdsourcing to malicious behaviour, and the
cost of undertaking it [18–41]. These three factors can attain a wide variety
of values depending on the particularities of the problem at hand, the economic
incentives at stake as well as the algorithmic platform supporting the collective
effort. For instance, the combinatorial nature of puzzle assembly in the DARPA
Shredder Challenge makes the solution very vulnerable to an attack at a low
cost—destroying puzzle progress is much easier than creating it. On the
other hand, fabricating a false balloon sighting in the DARPA Balloon Chal-
lenge is costly, as it involves a certain degree of counterintelligence skills,
more so when individuals posing in false submissions risk identifiability—
while at the same time, a false submission does not affect the validity of the
other submissions.
In this paper, we propose a formal analysis to explore the efficacy–
vulnerability trade-off of crowdsourcing in competitive scenarios. We adopt a
& 2014 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.scenario where two firms (players) compete against each
other to obtain a better solution to a task which can be crowd-
sourced. Our goal is to understand whether malicious
behaviour exemplified above is the norm or the anomaly,
i.e. whether we should expect players to undertake attacks
on the collective progress of competing players. We consider
the cost of attacking a crowdsourcing strategy, and investi-
gate the effect of higher costs on behaviour of the players.
We also aim to quantify how this malicious behaviour affects
the likelihood of using crowdsourcing as a strategy, and ulti-
mately how it impacts social welfare under collective
problem solving. Such an understanding will be helpful
for the design of future crowdsourcing competitions, as
well as support the decision process of institutions and
firms considering crowdsourcing.
Our main finding is that making attacks more costly per-
haps by making it more difficult to attack, does not deter the
attackers and results in a more costly and less efficient equili-
brium outcome. Paradoxically, making the cost of attacking
zero is best for the players. This suggests that care should
be used when attempting to discourage attacks by raising
the cost. In situations where damage from attacking is high,
the incentive to attack is very strong. Instead, crowdsourcing
competitions are more suited for scenarios where damage
inflicted by an attack is low.
In§2,wepresentamodelforstudyingthetrade-offbetween
higherproductivityofferedbycrowdsourcingandtheincreased
vulnerability that comes with it. Then, we derive the equili-
brium of the game defined by the model. We pay particular
attention to the casewhere both players choose to crowdsource
andinvestigatetheplayers’incentivestoattack.Wealsoanalyse
how the cost of an attack and the damage from the attack affect
the incentives of players to crowdsource.
2. The model
We study a non-cooperative situation where two players (or
firms) compete to obtain a better solution to a given task.
The firm with the better solution wins and receives a
reward of R. Each firm can develop an in-house solution or
crowdsource the task. The former is referred to as the
closed strategy, the latter as open. We focus on scenarios
where open strategies are likely to be more efficient even
though the exact level of efficiency is not known until after
a firm engages in crowdsourcing—this reflects a high level
of uncertainty underlying engagement processes in social
networks [42–49]. In addition, open strategies are susceptible
to attacks: a firm using an open strategy can be attacked by
the competing firm. The resulting damage from the attack
impairs the other firm, and may let the attacking firm win.
To investigate the trade-off between higher efficiency of
crowdsourcing and vulnerability to attacks, we propose a
model that isolates these two factors. In our model, a firm
decides whether or not to crowdsource, and whether or not
to attack the competitor. The nature of a crowdsourcing strat-
egy is that it is observable by everyone including the
competitors. If the competitor chooses to crowdsource, the
opponent would observe it, and can decide whether or not
to attack. Note that the decisions are sequential: the decision
about crowdsourcing is made first, whereas the decision
about attacking is made second. We model this interaction
as a sequential game.
Formally, we have a two-stage game. In the first stage, the
firms decide whether to solve the task in-house S or to crowd-
source it C. Then, the efficiencies of the firms that chose to
crowdsource are observed. Owing to the open nature of
crowdsourcing, the efficiency or productivity, of a crowdsour-
cing strategy used by player i becomes known not just to the
crowdsourcing player, but also to the opponent. We use Pi for
the random variable denoting the productivity and pi for its
realized value. The productivity of the in-house solution is
fixed and normalized to zero. We assume that the produc-
tivity of a crowdsourcing strategy is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1: Pi  U[0,1]. In the absence of attacks, the
firm with a higher productivity wins.
The assumption that the productivity of a crowdsourcing
firm is publicly known is consistent with competitions such
as the Shredder Challenge and the Tag Challenge. In the
Shredder Challenge, the current progress of each competitor
was publicly known. In the Tag Challenge, the teams
announced the number of targets they had successfully
identified as this increased the appeal of the team.
In the second stage, the players decide whether or not to
attack the opponent (attacking is denoted by A and not
attacking by N). An attack is costly, and the cost q [ (0,1) is
expressed as a fraction of the total reward R. This cost can
represent a range of situations: the human effort in disrupting
the opponent’s solution; the complexity of creating multiple
identities to carry out a Sybil attack; financial punishment
received when the attack is detected in a crowdsourcing
competition. The damage inflicted by the attack is denoted
by d [ (0,1), which determines how much productivity is
taken away from the open strategy (equivalently, how
much more productive the attacking firm becomes after
‘stealing’ the crowdsourced solution). The firm that has a
higher productivity at the end of the second stage wins the
prize R, which is normalized to be R ¼ 1. The parameters q
and d are publicly known. We characterize the equilibrium
of this two-stage game as a function of these parameters.
3. Equilibrium analysis
Wefindthesubgameperfectequilibriumofthetwo-stagegame.
Each pair of players’ decisions made in the first stage (to
crowdsource or not) result in a different second-stage game.
We first analyse each second-stage game (to attack or not).
Based on these, we then analyse how decisions are made in
the first stage.
When both players use an in-house strategy S, there is no
reason to attack, and they both choose N in the second stage.
Each one is equally likely to win, and the expected utility
of each is 1/2. We note this in the SS cell of the pay-off
matrix in table 1.
When player 1 crowdsources and player 2 does not, player
1 cannot attack, but player 2 attacks if doing so puts her
ahead of player 1. Player 2 attacks if the realized productivity
of player 1 is less than the damage p1 , d player 2 can
inflict. Recall that we normalized productivity of an in-house
solution to zero. The ex-ante utility of player 1 before her pro-
ductivity is realized is 1 2 d, i.e. she receives the pay-off of 1
when her productivity is high enough to not be attacked,
which, for uniformly distributed productivity, happens with
probability 1 2 d. The ex-ante utility of player 2 before the pro-
ductivity of player 1 is realized is d(1 2 q), i.e. the productivity
r
s
i
f
.
r
o
y
a
l
s
o
c
i
e
t
y
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
.
o
r
g
J
.
R
.
S
o
c
.
I
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
e
1
1
:
2
0
1
4
0
5
3
2
2of player 1 is low enough to be overtaken after an attack
(which happens with probability d), so player 2 attacks and
receives the reward minus the cost: 1 2 q.N o t et h a tp l a y e r2
attacks for any cost of an attack q [ [0, 1): attacking brings a
positive utility while not attacking results in zero utility. The
case when player 2 crowdsources, and player 1 does not is
symmetric. We summarize this in the CS and SC cells of the
pay-off matrix in table 1.
The most interesting case is when both players crowd-
source. Let p1 and p2 denote their productivities, which are
known before they decide on attacking. Consider the case
when p1 . p2. The other case is symmetric.
If the difference in productivities p1 2 d . p2 of the players
is so large that the attack by player 2 does not let her reach
player 1, then attacking does not change the outcome and
neither player attacks. In this case, player 1 receives the utility
of 1, whereas player 2 receives the utility of 0.
3.1. Crowdsourcing and attacking
We analyse the game when both players crowdsource and a
unilateral attack by the weak player (i.e. player 2) will bring
her ahead of the strong player (i.e. player 1). This is the
case when p1 2 d , p2. In this case, player 2 would like to
attack if player 1 does not. At the same time, player 1
would like to attack in order to keep its lead only if player
2 is attacking. Consequently, there is no pure strategy equili-
brium of this game. The pay-off matrix showing utilities for
each player appears in the following table.
AN
A 1 2 q, 2q 1 2 q,0
N 0, 1 2 q 1, 0
The game possesses a unique mixed equilibrium. Let
l1,l2 denote the probabilities that, respectively, players 1
and 2 attack. For player 1, attacking results in the expected
utility of
l2(1   q) þ (1   l2)(1   q) ¼ 1   q,( 3 :1)
whereas non-attacking gives the expected utility of
l2   0 þ 1   (1   l2) ¼ 1   l2: (3:2)
In a mixed equilibrium, a player’s expected utility from
choosing either action must be the same. This is satisfied
for player 1 when
1   q ¼ 1   l2,( 3 :3)
that is for
l2 ¼ q: (3:4)
Similarly, for player 2, the expected utility from attacking is
l1( q) þ (1   l1)(1   q) ¼ 1   q   l1: (3:5)
The expected utility from not attacking is 0, yielding the
equilibrium condition
l1 ¼ 1   q: (3:6)
Thus, in the mixed equilibrium, player 1 attacks with prob-
ability l1 ¼ 1 2 q, and player 2 attacks with probability
l2 ¼ q leading to the following observation.
Finding 1. The higher the cost, the more likely the weak player
(i.e. player 2) will attack and the less likely the strong
player will attack.
This behaviour contradicts the intuition that making attacks
more costly helps prevent them, that is, the costlier it is to
attack, the less either player should attack. We explain why
this does not hold by looking into the reasons for players’
attacks. Player 1 attacks only to counteract a possible attack
of player 2. Player 2 attacks in the hope that the attack is not
counteracted by player 1 allowing player 2 to get ahead. Cru-
cially, the incentive of player 1 to attack increases in the
likelihood that player 2 attacks, whereas the incentive of
player 2 to attack decreases in the likelihood that player 1
attacks. This relationship becomes clear when we observe that
l1 ¼ 1   l2:
The cost of attacks increases the likelihood that player 2
attacks, because player 1 attacks less when the cost is higher.
Whenever both players attack, player 1 wins with certainty,
and player 2 would have preferred to avoid the useless and
costly attack. Thus, the less player 1 is likely to attack (i.e. the
higher the cost), the more eager player 2 is to attack. For
example, when attacking is free, player 1 always attacks and
always wins obtaining the utility of 1. When the cost is the
same as the prize, q ¼ 1, player 2 always attacks taking the
prize away from player 1 who does not attack resulting in
zero utility for both. Formally, player 2 wins when he attacks
and player 1 does not, which occurs with probability
l2(1   l1) ¼ q(1   (1   q)) ¼ q2:
Consequently, player 1 wins with probability
1   q2:
The higher the cost of an attack, the more likely the weak
player is to win!
Finding 2. Instead of protecting the better crowdsourcing strategy,
a higher cost of an attack increases the probability of the weaker
crowdsourcing strategy winning.
Thisisastrikingobservation.Makingattacksmorecostlyshould
help the society by ensuring the stronger strategy wins. This
does not occur owing to a higher likelihood that the weak
playerattacks unilaterally,which would lead her tovictory. Fur-
thermore, the players spend more resources on attacking each
Table 1. Expected pay-off matrix for the crowdsourcing game.
CS
C 1=2   (d   (d2=2))q,1 =2   (d   (d2=2))q 1 2 d, d(1 2 q)1 2 q,0
Sd (1 2 q), 1 2 d 1/2, 1/2
r
s
i
f
.
r
o
y
a
l
s
o
c
i
e
t
y
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
.
o
r
g
J
.
R
.
S
o
c
.
I
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
e
1
1
:
2
0
1
4
0
5
3
2
3other: making attacks more costly results in a lower total utility
of the players. To show this, we first note that the expected
number of attacks does not change with the cost of an attack.
Raising the cost results in a lower probability of attack by the
strong player and in a higher probability of attack by the weak
player: the weak player attacks with probability q and the
strong player attacks with probability 1 2 q.
Finding 3. The expected number of attacks
1 is one, regardless of
the cost of an attack q.
A direct consequence is the following:
Finding 4. Increasing the cost of an attack decreases (not increases)
the total utility of the players.
Wenowlookatthecompetitionfromthepointofviewofwhatis
sociallyoptimal.Benefittothesocietyisproportionaltothefinal
qualityofthesolutionaswellastothetotalutilityoftheplayers.
We intentionally leave the exact definition of social welfare open.
Combining findings 2 and 4, we conclude that
Finding 5. Increasing the cost of an attack results in lower social
welfare.
Thisfindingsuggeststhatincreasingthecostofanattackisdama-
ging rather than helping. Setting the costs to zero would be
optimal from the social welfare point of view: the strong player
would attack and win with probability 1, the weak player
would not attack, and the cost of attacking would be zero. With-
out an attack of the weak player, the final solution—that of the
strong player—would be of the highest possible quality.
Finding 6. Free attacks maximize social welfare.
3.1.1. Uncertain attacks
We assumed that an attackinflicts a knowndamageofd.I nt h i s
section, we extend the results to uncertain attacks. Let s denote
theprobabilitythatanattackissuccessfulatinflictingdamaged.
Otherwise, no damage is inflicted. Setting s ¼ 1 results in the
game discussed above. At the end of the section, we interpret
the results when s is proportional to the difference in the
productivities of the players.
The pay-off matrix given the probability of success s is
AN
A 1 2 q 2 (s 2 s
2), (s 2 s
2) 2 q 1 2 q,0
N 1 2 s, s 2 q 1, 0
When both players attack, the weak player wins if his attack
is successful, and the attack of the strong player is unsuccess-
ful. This occurs with probability s(1 2 s) ¼ s 2 s
2. The utility
of the strong player is
(1   (s   s2))   q ¼ (1   q)   (s   s2):
Other entries in the pay-off matrix are computed in a similar
manner.
We derive the equilibria of this generalized game. As
before, for player 1, attacking results in the expected utility of
l2(1   q   s þ s2) þ (1   l2)(1   q)
¼ 1   q   l2s þ l2s2,( 3 :7)
whereas non-attacking gives the expected utility of
l2(1   s) þ (1   l2) ¼ 1   l2s: (3:8)
In a mixed equilibrium, a player’s expected utility from
choosing either action must be the same. This is satisfied
for player 1 when
1   q   l2s þ l2s2 ¼ 1   l2s,( 3 :9)
that is for
l2 ¼
q
s2 : (3:10)
For player 2, the expected utility from attacking is
l1(s   s2   q) þ (1   l1)(s   q) ¼  l1q þ l1s   l1s2
þ s   q   l1s þ l1q ¼  l1s2 þ s   q:
The expected utility from not attacking is 0, yielding the
equilibrium condition
l1 ¼
s   q
s2 ¼
1
s
 
q
s2 ¼
1
s
  l2:
Our main conclusion regarding uncertain attacks is that
the mixed equilibrium has the same structure as with certain
attacks, and the lessons learned for certain attacks continue to
hold. Specifically, the structure of the mixed equilibrium
in both cases is l1 ¼ constant 2l2. Interestingly, a higher
probability of success makes, the weak player attack less
often.
2 This finding is similar to finding 2: making attacks
more costly or less certain does not help the strong player.
The expected number of attacks
3 is 1/s.
Finding 7. The lower the probability of the success of an attack, the
more attacks occur.
The equilibrium utility of the weak player is zero, whereas
from equations (3.9) and (3.10), the equilibrium utility of
the strong player is 1 2 (q/s). Therefore, the more effective
the attacks are, the higher the utility of the strong player.
This is a counterintuitive result similar to finding 5.
Finding 8. The equilibrium utility of the strong player (and the
total utility of the players) increases in s.
The mixed equilibria derived above holds only for 0   l1,
l2   1, i.e. when
q   s2
q   s   s2:
This region is denoted by ‘mixed’ in figure 1. When these
conditions do not hold, there is a unique pure strategy equi-
librium. Specifically, for q . s, not attacking is the unique
equilibrium for both players. For q , s and q . s
2, the
strong player does not attack, whereas the weak player
does. For q , s
2 and q , s 2 s
2, both players attack.
In more detail, if the cost of an attack is above s, then no
attacks occur—the best possible outcome from the social wel-
fare point of view. Thus, higher q is beneficial, but only if it is
above s.I fq falls below s but remains above s
2, an undesirable
equilibrium arises: the weak player attacks unilaterally,
resulting in a high chance of the weak player winning. For
relatively low values of q, both players choose to attack (see
the AA region in figure 1). Observe, the case when s ¼ 1.
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4As we discussed in §3.1, for certain attacks, higher values of q
do not increase social welfare (findings 2 and 5).
Wecharacterizedtheequilibriafromallvalues ofs.W eno w
explainhowtheseresultscanbeinterpretedwhenthesuccessof
anattackisproportionaltothedistancebetweentheplayers.An
attack is successful from the weak player’s point of view if it
allows the weak player to overtake the strong player who
does not attack. The closer the current solution qualities of
the weak and the strong players, the easier it is for the weak
player’s to get ahead of the strong one. To model this, we set
s ¼ 12(p12 p2/d) which denotes the probability that a unilat-
eral attack takes the weak player ahead of the strong one.
Note that s linearly increases from zero to one as the distance
in productivities decreases from d to zero.
Knowing that the weak player may attack successfully, the
strong player may want to attack to reduce the chances that
the weak player gets ahead of the strong player. We use the
same parameter s to denote the probability that the attack of
thestrongplayerissuccessful,i.e.thatthestrongplayerremains
ahead of the weak player, thanks to its own attack.
The reader may find it counterintuitive that the success
of the strong player’s attack is inversely proportional to
how much better his solution is relative to the weak player.
However, the success here is defined as setting back the strat-
egy of the weak player to prevent an otherwise successful
attack of the weak player. It is easier to attack a solution
that is of high quality. Indeed, at the extreme case of zero
quality solution, an attack is not possible at all. The more
the weak player has achieved in its solution, the more
the strong player can take away from him. The parameter
s ¼ 12(p1 2 p2/d) is consistent with this relationship.
The model where attacks are successful with probability s
allows insight to be gained into a situation where a player
does not know the exact productivity of the opponent. The
probability s can be viewed as a player’s estimate that an
attack is going to let her overtake the opponent whose
productivity she does not know.
The analysis and interpretations of this section point to
the robustness of our main results to the assumptions of
observability of the opponent’s productivity and known
damage of the attack.
3.2. To crowdsource or not
In §3.1, we computed expected utilities in the second-stage
game when both players crowdsource and p1 2 d , p2.W e
now take a step back and compute expected utilities when
both players crowdsource, but before their productivities
become known. To avoid confusion, we refer to these utilities
as ex-ante utilities. We focus on the case of s ¼ 1, i.e. the case
where the mixed equilibrium is played for all values of q
(figure 1). The ex-ante utility of player 1 (and symmetrically
of player 2) is
u1 ¼ Pr(P2 , P1 , P2 þ d)(1   q) þ Pr(P2 þ d , P1):
The first term corresponds to the utility of player 1 in the
mixed equilibrium of the game described above, and the
second term corresponds to player 1 winning with certainty
when player 2 cannot reach her even after attacking. Under
the assumption that P1 and P2 are uniformly distributed
between zero and one, we derive
Pr(P2,P1,P2þd)¼
ð1
0
ð1
0
1{p2,p1,p2þd}dp2dp1
¼
ð1
0
ðmin(p2þd,1)
p2
1dp1dp2
¼
ð1
0
(min(p2þd,1) p2)dp2
¼
ð1 d
0
ddp2þ
ð1
1 d
(1 p2)dp2
¼ (1 d)dþ 1 
1
2
  
  1 d 
(1 d)
2
2
 !
¼d 
d2
2
Pr(P2þd,P1)¼
ð1
0
ð1
0
1{p2þd,p1}1dp2dp1
¼
ð1
d
ðp1 d
0
1dp2dp1¼
ð1
d
(p1 d)dp1
¼
1
2
 d 
d2
2
 d2
  
¼
d2
2
 dþ
1
2
The ex-ante utility of either player is
u1 ¼ u2 ¼ d  
d2
2
  
(1   q) þ
d2
2
  d þ
1
2
  
1
¼
1
2
  d  
d2
2
  
q:
The utility of the players decreases in both q and d. At the
extreme case when both q and d are 1, the utility is zero.
Whenever either of the parameters is at its minimum value
of zero, the utility is at its maximum value of 1/2. Observe
that the ex-ante utility decreases in the cost of an attack.
This is a consequence of the number of attacks being indepen-
dent of q when both p1 2 d , p2 as we noted in finding 3 and
a related finding 4.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma [50–53], the unique equili-
brium for both players is to choose the action that hurts the
other player, i.e. to defect. In the resulting equilibrium, both
players are hurt. A similar situation (although in mixed strat-
egies) arises in the crowdsourcing game. Both players choose
to attack (in equilibrium, the expected number of attacks is 1),
incurring unproductive costs. When both players attack, the
outcome is the same as when neither player attacks except
that each player incurs the cost of an attack. When only the
strong player attacks, the outcome does not change, but the
player incurs the cost of an attack. When only the weak
player attacks, the outcome changes for a less efficient out-
come (the weaker player wins), and the weak player incurs
1.0
0.5
0 0.5 1.0
s
q
NN
NA
AA
mixed
Figure 1. Equilibrium strategies in the second-stage game when both players
crowdsource and p1 2 d , p2. (Online version in colour.)
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5the cost of an attack. Only when neither player attacks, there
is no loss to social welfare.
Having analysed the second-stage games, we can now
describe the entire pay-off matrix for the game played in
the first stage. Note that in the first stage, the players are
unaware of their productivities, should they choose crowd-
sourcing. Thus, the pay-off matrix contains their ex-ante
utilities, depicted in table 1.
We ask the question of how q and d affect the equilibria.
For any choice of parameters, only CC and SS can be pure
strategy equilibria. Higher damage from an attack and low
cost of attacking corresponds to the crowdsourcing strategy
being more risky. Indeed, as we detail below, for d . 1/2
and q , ((2d 2 1)/d2), SS is the only equilibrium strategy
(figure 2). When the damage is low (d , 1/2), crowdsourcing
is the only equilibrium strategy, regardless of the cost of
attack. For the remaining range of parameters d   1/2 and
q   ((2d 2 1)/d2), both CC and SS are equilibrium strategies.
Crowdsourcing CC is a unique equilibrium when the
damage inflicted by an attack is low d , 1/2. Indeed, when
both firms use closed strategies, deviating to a crowdsourcing
strategy provides a higher pay-off (12d . 1/2); the pro-
ductivity of a crowdsourcing strategy will make the
crowdsourcing firm outside the reach of the in-house compe-
titor even after being attacked. Crowdsourcing for one firm
and not crowdsourcing for the other is not stable, as the
non-crowdsourcing firm is better off switching to crowdsour-
cing 1=2   (d   (d2=2))q . d(1   q): This holds regardless of
the cost of an attack 0 , q , 1.
For d   1/2, CC remains an equilibrium only if the cost of
an attack is high enough: q   ((2d 2 1)/d2). Intuitively,
players crowdsource when attacking costs a lot (higher q)
and is not effective (lower d).
How does the cost of an attack influence the likelihood of
players to crowdsource? Intuitively, we would expect that
high costs prevent attacks and make crowdsourcing more
appealing. Our model provides reasoning against this intui-
tion. Figure 2 reveals that q has a limited effect on the
choice of the equilibrium strategy. Cost of attacking matters
only when the level of damage is high (d   1/2). In this
case, high costs enable CC to be an equilibrium; however,
SS still remains an equilibrium.
The damage from an attack has a strong effect on the
equilibrium. Low damage corresponds to fewer attacks on a
crowdsourcingfirm:whenboth playerscrowdsource,thelikeli-
hoodthat the strong player iswithin reach of theweak player is
proportional to the level of damage, Pr(P2 , P1 , P2 þ d).
Crowdsourcing is the unique equilibrium strategy for low
levels of damage (d , 1/2). This leads to the conclusion that
competitions where the maximal damage on a crowdsourcing
opponent is limited are more likely to promote crowdsourc-
ing than competitions where the designer attempts to make
attacking more costly.
4. Discussion
Our results bear resemblance to the Prisoner’s Dilemma but
paint an even starker picture. When both players crowd-
source (i.e. choose a more efficient way of performing the
task) and are close to each other in terms of solution quality
(specifically, within the damage inflicted by attacking, as was
the case in the DARPA Shredder Challenge), the expected
number of attacks is one, regardless of the cost of an attack.
Increasing the cost of an attack offers no deterrence. There-
fore, under our basic model, malicious behaviour is the
expected behaviour, not the anomaly. Given this result and
the examples of malicious behaviour in competitions, more
emphasis should be given to the issue. There has been signifi-
cant academic interest towards filtering misinformation;
however, models of malicious behaviour in crowdsourcing
scenarios have been absent until this work.
Our model applies more generally than malicious behav-
iour in competitive crowdsourcing. The same strategic
considerations arise when instead of attacking the opponent
a player can improve her own solution by d by investing q.
The salient feature is that there is only one winner in the com-
petition. Our results are for two competitors, however, they
provide insight into strategies of two top competitors in a
multi-competitor competition.
The finding that raising costs of attack is harmful for the
players is striking and warrants further empirical investi-
gation. Our model predicts that higher costs of attacks lead
to more attacks by the weak player resulting in a higher prob-
ability that the weak player would win. Furthermore, the
expected number of attacks remains the same, resulting in
higher costs incurred by the players orchestrating attacks.
We also find that making attacks less likely to succeed does
not help prevent them (within the mixed equilibrium).
On the contrary, a lower probability that an attack is success-
ful results in a higher expected number of attacks.
Confirming these findings in a laboratory or field experiment
is a direction for future work.
We made a number of modelling choices: two firms, per-
fect observability of productivities, risk-neutrality of the
players, and provided the analysis for a uniform distribution
of productivities. These choices were guided by simplicity
and the goal to isolate the factors relevant to the trade-off
between higher productivity of open strategies and higher
vulnerability. Owing to the simplicity of our model, we
believe that our results capture the fundamental features of
the trade-off between the productivity/vulnerability.
Indeed, we showed that the results continue to hold when
we allow attacks to be uncertain. Having said this, we
acknowledge that our conclusions rely on the assumptions
made, and that their broader applicability must be confirmed
on a case-by-case basis.
We considered the relative performance of the firms while
ignoring the absolute quality of the solution. This explains
why the highest expected social welfare is obtained when
neither firm crowdsources, and therefore, neither firm attacks
1.0
0.5
0
0 0.5 1.0
d
q
  ,
Figure 2. Equilibrium strategies. (Online version in colour.)
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6(see the pay-off of the (S,S) strategy in table 1). This is suitable
for many competition settings where only relative perform-
ance is important (such as the aforementioned DARPA
Network Challenge, DARPA Shredder Challenge or Tag
Challenge). Requiring a certain minimum solution quality
and modelling the cost of effort are interesting extensions
for future work. For example, one could model effort as
time required to find a solution, with the time being inversely
related to productivity (e.g. t ¼ 1 2 p). Competitions may
also mitigate aggression by using reward mechanisms
where the reward received by the winner depends on the
global progress of all teams—linking crowdsourcing games
to public good games [54–57].
Repeated encounters in crowdsourcing competitions may
provide opportunities for the emergence of a richer set of
sociallydesirablestrategiesasintheiteratedPrisonersDilemma
[58–60]. It would also be interesting to study how the presence
of more than two players affects the behaviour displayed.
Our results emphasize that despite crowdsourcing being a
more efficient way of accomplishing many tasks, it also a less
secure approach. In scenarios of ‘competitive’ crowdsourcing,
where there is an inherent desire to hurt the opponent, attacks
on crowdsourcing strategies are essentially unavoidable.
We expect these surprising results derived in our stylized
model to hold in a variety of more complicated scenarios that
exhibit the fundamental tension between openness, efficiency
and vulnerability.
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End notes
1Note that in this one-shot game the number of attacks is limited to
one per player. Therefore, the total number of attacks ranges from
zero to two.
2A higher probability of attack makes the strong attack more often for
s . 2q and less often for s , 2q. In the formercase, a higher s decreases
thedeterrencepowerofl1ontheweakplayer,andahigherprobability
of attack is needed. In the latter case, the reverse is true.
3The highest possible number of attacks is one per player, or two in
total. Indeed, the relevant range of the parameter s is above 1/2 as we
will see in figure 1.
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